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Abstract 
This study analyzes the share price reactions of real estate development and 
building/construction materials corporations in relation to FIRB rule changes. It appears 
companies as a whole were indifferent to the rule changes; however individual securities 
returns were wildly different. These findings suggest that the FIRB rule changes had a 
mixed effect on different corporations possibly based on their exposure to the Australian 
real estate market.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Acknowledgments 
 First and foremost, I would like to thank my parents. We may have not agreed on 
things throughout my life, but I know you guys always had my best interest and heart. 
Your support has made all of this possible.  
 I would also like to thank Professor Bjerk on agreeing to be my reader, despite not 
having any experience in my field of study. A special thanks to Professor Burdekin, 
without your advice this thesis would not be possible. Your guidance helped me 
overcome many of the obstacles I faced throughout the writing process.  
 I would also like to thank my girlfriend Sara Stevens, she was my true ECON 180 
professor. You pushed me to follow every deadline, despite my best efforts to avoid 
them. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table of Contents 
Acknowledgments 
Abstract 
I. Introduction………………………………………………………………………..1 
II. Background………………………………………………………………………..5 
a. FIRB…………………………………………………………………….....5 
b. Australian-Chinese Economic Relations………………………………….7 
III. Empirical Approach……………………………………………………………….8 
a. Testing for Short-Term Returns…………………………………………...9 
b. Testing for Long-Term Returns………………………………………….11 
IV. Data………………………………………………………………………………13 
V. Results……………………………………………………………………………15 
a. Testing for Short-Term Returns………………………………………….15 
b. Testing for Long-Term Returns………………………………………….20 
VI. Conclusion……………………………………………………………………….21 
References………………………………………………………………………………..23 
Figures and Tables……………………………………………………………………….27 
Appendix…………………………………………………………………………………37 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1 
 
I. Introduction 
During the past few years, there has been a growing concern about the 
affordability of housing in Australia. From 2011 to 2016, Australian property prices have 
grown by 35%, Sydney by 57.3% and Melbourne by 50.7% (Australian Bureau of 
Statistics 2016), and are often cited as the least affordable in the world (Demographia 
2016). Popular Australian media have portrayed the growing number of foreign real 
estate investors as the primary reason for the growth in real estate prices (Wong 2017). 
These claims are not baseless; diagram 1 shows Chinese investment has grown from 4 
billion Australian dollars in 2011 to 24.35 billion in 2015. Specifically, Chinese 
investment has increased from 10% of total real estate investment to 25.1% in the same 
timeframe. Additionally, per a study by the National Australian Bank, at its peak, foreign 
buyers accounted for 15.7% of new home purchases in the third quarter of 2015 and 9% 
of total demand for established properties (NAB 2016). These numbers do not include all 
the illegal and alternative methods available to overseas investors, underestimating the 
figures above. These facts appear to present a correlation between the growth in housing 
prices and the increase in foreign investment, especially in Melbourne and Sydney, which 
are home to four-fifths of all foreign investment (Gauder Houssard & Orsmond 2014).  
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Diagram 1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
However, Chinese investment is not the only cause of Australia’s rapid growth in 
housing prices. First, many Australian cities face major supply constraints that boost 
prices. Most Australian cities are built along the coast and along mountain ranges, which 
restricts the construction of new housing units outward (Richards 2008). Along with 
geographic constraints to supply, the country has installed policies to limit the outward 
expansion of cities to curtail ‘urban sprawl,’ resulting in boosted prices. In Australian 
cities, zoning laws have contributed to inflating housing prices by prescribing certain 
tracts of land to be high or low (Kulish, Richards and Gillitzer 2012).  
 On the demand side, in the 1970’s, Australian housing markets were heavily 
regulated. In the mid-1980s, there was a decision to deregulate the housing market 
ultimately causing interest rates to lower in the 1990s. The deregulated housing market 
and the low-interest rate environment have been some of the many factors behind the 
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increase in domestic Australian housing demand (Stapledon 2016). Accompanied by the 
low-interest rates and deregulation, Australia is currently experiencing a migration shift 
in its largest cities, boosting major city prices. Structural changes in the economy have 
moved away from labor-intensive industrial production towards a centrally located 
knowledge-based economy, where the migration is centralized. The changes in the 
econommmy has created a migration shift from the urban fringe towards the cities (Yates 
2016). 
 While most Australians place the blame on Chinese buyers, the legislative 
framework has modeled the public's concerns by attempting to curtail foreign investment 
to keep Australian housing prices lower and push out housing supply. Under Australian 
laws, foreign nationals are not allowed to purchase existing dwellings, but rather they 
must purchase new dwellings (FIRB Factsheet 2015). With Chinese money still looking 
to go abroad to Australia, many residential housing builders have built housing 
specifically for Chinese buyers (Wong 2017). The restraints on spending has created a 
dichotomy between not only the prices of new dwellings and existing dwellings but also 
the purchasers of these homes. Foreign nationals often purchase homes above the average 
home price, whereas first-time domestic homebuyers bought homes below the average 
home price (Gauder Houssard & Orsmond 2014). Thanks to the pre-existing legislative 
framework, this may have pushed out the supply of housing, benefiting Australian 
citizens. 
The legislative framework for foreign investment relies on on, what sets Australia 
apart from other countries, a government body called the Foreign Investment Review 
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Board, otherwise known as the FIRB. The FIRB’s role is to review foreign investments 
and prevent any investment that may be against Australia’s national interest (FIRB About 
2017). The FIRB evaluates investments in business acquisitions, agribusiness, media 
business, commercial and agricultural land, mining tenements, and most importantly, for 
the purposes of this study, real estate. The FIRB changes, mentioned above, were 
announced on Saturday, May 2, 2015, by Prime Minister Tony Abbott and Treasurer Joe 
Hockey while making a joint announcement confirming a raft of changes to the foreign 
investments rules that would be implemented on December 1st, 2015. The changes 
implemented focused on tightening foreign investment rules already in place. The new 
changes included streamlining the process for finding violators by putting detection under 
one agency, the Australian Tax Office, and increasing fines and jail time for violators. 
More importantly, the new rules implemented fees for new foreign investment 
applications. These fees can range from AUD$5,000 to AUD$100,000, depending on the 
value of the property (McCullough Robertson 2015).  
Overall, with the legislative framework, Australian housing prices have 
experienced a dramatic increase during the past decade due to numerous factors. 
Endogenous factors include the lack of brownfield and greenfield development areas in 
Melbourne and Sydney. The lack of readily available land to develop can lead to a supply 
constraint pushing prices up. Exogenously, clear increase in investment abroad, 
especially from Chinese nationals, has pushed demand out as well. These developments 
mirror other English-speaking countries such as the United States, the United Kingdom, 
and Canada, specifically, in such cities as Palo Alto, Los Angeles, New York, London, 
and Vancouver. The major difference between other major English speaking developed 
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nations and Australia is the FIRB and the legislative framework that it enforces. This 
study will explore the effect of the new FIRB regulatory framework on the Australian 
real estate market through an event study of Australian public equities.  
II. Background 
II(a) FIRB 
 Australia’s Foreign Investment Review Board, otherwise known as the FIRB, is a 
non-statutory body established in 1976 to advise the Treasurer and the Government on 
Australia’s Foreign Investment Policy and its administration. Their role is to review 
foreign investments and prevent any investment that may be against Australia’s national 
interest (FIRB About). The FIRB will evaluate investments in business acquisitions, 
agribusiness, media business, commercial and agricultural land, mining tenements, and 
most importantly for the purposes of this study, real estate. Under the FIRB’s legislative 
framework, a foreign national can only purchase new dwellings, and can only buy an 
established dwelling under special circumstances. The purpose behind Australia’s 
legislative framework is to channel foreign investments into new dwellings to create 
additional jobs in the construction industry, increase government revenues from stamp 
duties and other taxes, and increase Australia’s housing supply (FIRB About). 
 Individual foreign investment in real estate has been on the FIRB’s agenda since 
the 1980s. Initially, in 1976, the FIRB did not consider real estate acquisitions by 
foreigners. However, by 1982, purchases of real estate by foreign nationals came under 
the FIRB’s authority. Through the 1960’s and 1970’s, Australia experienced its most 
restrictive environment for business development. The Australian government has 
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recognized a 30 percent decline in capital productivity during that period due to the 
restrictive nature of the regulatory environment. The restrictive setting was due to a wave 
of economic nationalism that perceived foreign investment as a loss of sovereignty and 
foreign acquisitions to mean a loss of jobs (Foreign Investment Policy in Australia). The 
Australian government recognized these flaws in their self-harmful legislative framework 
and sought to liberalize the system to encourage foreign investment. For example, in 
1999 ‘Advanced-off-the-plan certificates’ were introduced, which allowed developers to 
pre-approve the sale of up to 50 percent of development to foreign investors. In 2008, 
temporary residents no longer needed FIRB approval to purchase real estate. However, 
by 2009, sections of the housing industry were reporting increasing real estate prices 
(Rogers Lee & Yan 2015). In result, following in 2010, the rising concerns of housing 
affordability and the anti-foreign investment rhetoric in Australian media led to re-
tightening of restrictions (Wong 2017).  
The most recent legislation was announced in 2015 and was enforced at the 
beginning of 2016 under the Foreign Acquisitions and Takeovers Regulation 2015 and 
the Foreign Acquisitions and Takeovers Fees Imposition Regulation 2015. The new 
legislation had three parts. One was to streamline the process for finding and prosecuting 
violators of existing FIRB rules by putting all relevant information under one 
organization, the Australian Tax Office. The second was to increase the penalties and 
fines for violators, including jail time. The third was to impose an application fee for 
foreign investors from A$5,000 to A$100,000. The new regulation also imposed a cap on 
the amount an individual foreigner can purchase interests in “advanced off the plan” 
developments to A$3 million, down from A$5 million.  
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II(b) Chinese Australian Economic Relations 
 Australia has been one of the many beneficiaries of China’s economic growth. 
Since 2009, China has become an increasingly important trade partner for Australia. In 
2013 to 2014, China accounted for roughly one-third of all export dollars in the fiscal 
year and accounted for eighty percent export of dollar growth during the same period 
(Australian Trade Commission 2015). In result, in December 2015, the Australian and 
Chinese government announced the China-Australia Free Trade Agreement, CHAFTA. 
CHAFTA eliminated customs duties, incorporated non-tariff measures, and introduced 
many other policies to encourage trade between the two nations (CHAFTA 2015). 
China’s increased role in Australia’s export market along with CHAFTA have made 
Australia more vulnerable to fluctuations in the Chinese market.  
 The link between shocks in the Chinese economy and the Australian economy has 
been shown at the macroeconomic level. It has been shown that shocks to Chinese M2 
have significance effects on the Australian economy (Burdekin & Tao 2016). For 
instance, Australia avoided a technical recession because of China’s two-year fiscal 
stimulus in the wake of the 2008 financial crisis, and the ensuing slowdown in world 
trade. China accelerated already existing infrastructure plans and built up a strategic 
stockpile of raw materials. China’s increase demand for raw materials led to a boom for 
Australian GDP, and without the increased stimulus, Australia would have experienced 
three straight quarters of negative growth in real GDP (Day 2011). 
 As the link between the Chinese and Australian grew stronger, so has Chinese 
immigration to Australia. For instance, more and more Chinese students are flocking to 
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Australian universities. In 2016, 196,315 Chinese students attended Australian 
undergraduate and graduate institutions, representing approximately 27% of the 
international population in Australia (Australian Government 2017). Chinese tourism has 
experienced a similar trend. Chinese visitors increased from 100,000 in the year 2000 to 
one million in January 2016, with an average annual growth rate of 18 percent since 
2010. Chinese visitors spent A$ 1.5 billion in 2015 and spent A$7.7 billion in 2015. The 
increase in Chinese tourism is not by accident. Australian tourism executives 
aggressively target Chinese tourists through marketing, distribution, and partnership 
strategies (Tourism Australia 2016). China’s growing economic ties are some of the 
many reasons why Chinese nationals have increased their investment in Australian real 
estate. (Rogers & Co 2015)  
III. Empirical Approach: 
The goal of this analysis is to test if the announcement of FIRB rule changes 
affected the stock performance of relevant real estate development and 
building/construction materials companies. To accomplish this, I utilize two empirical 
processes, an event study, and an OLS regression, to determine if the rule changes 
affected short-term and long-term returns.   
I reason increased restrictions on foreign direct investment in real estate will 
decrease construction activity in Australia. Such decreased construction activity would 
hurt the top and bottom line growth for all real estate development and 
construction/building material companies. Therefore, I hypothesize there will be a 
negative spike in stock price returns for all Australian companies that have high 
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exposure to the real estate market relative to normal market returns, or negative long-
term returns relative to normal market returns.  
Method (A) Testing for Short-Term Effects on Returns 
To test for short-term effects on Australian real estate development and 
building/construction materials companies, I use an event study. An event study aims to 
examine the impact of positive and negative news on investor reactions in the stock 
market. Brown and Warner (1984) find event study results are consistent across altered 
conditions like smaller samples and longer event periods. The efficient market 
hypothesis states that at any given time and in a liquid market, security prices fully 
reflect all available information (Morning Star 2017). Using the efficient market 
hypothesis, the stock market is efficient enough to determine the impact of the FIRB 
rules changes in relation to relevant corporations’ future earnings.  
Specifically, in this thesis, an index of real estate development and 
building/construction materials companies share price reactions in response to the FIRB 
rule change was assessed. These reactions are measured through calculating the 
abnormal returns relative to the Australian stock market while controlling for lagged 
effects. In this study, to perform the regression for the distributed lag model, I need to 
consider relevant construction companies and an index that reflect normal equity 
performance in Australia. The index I use for market returns will be the All Ordinaries 
Index. The All Ordinaries Index is the oldest index of shares in Australia and is made of 
the 500 largest companies listed on the Australian Securities Exchange (S&P 2017). In 
my regressions, I use two separately made indices that weight each stock by market cap 
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within the index. The two indices are a compilation of representative Australian real 
estate development and building/construction materials companies. One index contains 
the seven largest equities by market capitalization in the sector, and the other index 
contains all relevant public companies. I reason that companies of different size have 
different exposure to foreign direct investment, and the FIRB rule has different effects 
on corporate profits.  
 This event study is performed through STATA in reference to Kim (2015). The 
event dates assessed on May 2nd, 2015, the date of the rule change announcement. The 
event window is the minimum number of observations before and after the event date and 
the estimation window is the minimum number of observations before the event window. 
In this thesis, event windows of ±1 and ±2 days and estimation windows of 15, 30, and 
45 days were applied to the two indices to assess the immediate share price responses.  
Before the abnormal returns analysis, it is necessary to estimate the normal 
performance of the indices’ share price, which is completed through using a market 
model that assumes a linear relationship between the daily returns of the index and the 
All Ordinaries index. The equation is as follows: 
Rft = αf + βfRmkt + eft 
Where Rft is the daily return of the real estate development and construction materials 
index at time t, αf is the intercept, βf is the coefficient of Rmkt which is the daily return of 
the All Ordinary index, and eft is the error for the construction equity index.  
 Thus, the dependent variable in this model is the daily return of the index and the 
independent variable is the daily return of the All Ordinaries index. The normal 
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benchmark performance is the return around the event window that would have followed 
in the absence of any shift.  
 After estimating normal performance, abnormal returns are calculated by simply 
subtracting the predicted normal return from the actual return for the dates within the 
event window. The equation is as follows:  
ARft = Rft - α̂f - β̂fRmkt 
Then cumulative abnormal returns were computed by adding all the abnormal 
returns for the index. Under the null hypothesis in which the event’s effects are 
insignificant, the abnormal return should normally be determined with a zero conditional 
mean and conditional variance. The significance of the abnormal returns is calculated by 
dividing the cumulative abnormal return ΣARft by the standard deviation of ARft. The 
statistical significance was determined at the 90%, 95%, and at the 99% level which 
corresponds to absolute statistical values of 1.64, 1.96, and 2.58. 
Method (B) Testing for Long-Term Effects on Returns 
 The event study method above looks at short-term changes in stock prices to see 
the market reaction to different incidents. In this case, it is possible that the market does 
not react rapidly to the information. Rather, the effect of a new policy or law can be 
spread out over time. When looking at figures 1 through 10, there is a dip in stock price 
for both indices and the individual securities examined in methodology 1. The dip in 
stock price may be due to the lag in response of the stock market. I reason that the 
existence of the longstanding FIRB and the pre-existing rules will not make investor 
sentiment change. Only the new regulations could affect overall corporate earnings. 
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Even, if the new FIRB rules did affect corporate earnings, then it’s effect could emerge 
gradually over time, rather than immediately. To account for this possibility, I will 
employ an ordinary least squares multivariate regression to determine whether an 
association exists between the returns of a composite of real estate development 
companies and the announcement and enforcement of new FIRB rule changes, when 
controlling for returns of the overall Australian stock market returns. I regress four 
separate indices that were used in the event study against the corresponding lag 
dependent variables. Two of the four indices were re-used from method 1, and the other 
indices were the first two indices removing Lend Lease Group, the largest real estate 
development company in Australia. I remove Lend Lease Group because its size may 
bias the results, as its returns will be weighted more than all other companies. The lags 
are determined using the likelihood ratio test. I use the likelihood ratio test because it is 
the most forgiving methodology for determining lags. I then use the All Ordinaries Index 
as the proxy for normal market returns to see test if the effect of the new FIRB 
regulations affected the market over time rather than in the window.  
 Using the methodology above and the simple Ordinary Least Squares regression, 
the following econometric model is specified as: 
Index Returnsi,t  = β1 All Ordinariesi,t + β2 Index returnsi,t-1 + … + βn Index returnsi,t-n + 
Dn + εi,t 
 Where Index returns represent the daily return of the composite of publicly traded 
Australian real estate development companies, All Ordinaries represents the daily return 
of the All Ordinaries Index, i.e., the daily return of the Australian stock market and the 
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lags represent the lag dependent variables determined by the likelihood ratio test. For the 
dummy, I use it to account for any changes in return to the indices relative to the All 
Ordinaries Index. I use three different regressions to run the dummy variable. One 
dummy variable is “turned on” day of the announcement. I refer to this dummy as 
dummy 1. The next regression, the dummy is “turned on” for a three-day “window”, the 
day before the announcement, the day of the announcement, and the day after the 
announcement. I refer to this dummy as dummy 2. In the last regression, the dummy is 
“turned on” for perpetuity after the announcement. In the regression, I refer to this 
dummy as dummy 3. 
 Since the FIRB rule changes not only include changes in foreign direct investment 
in real estate but also in investment in other parts of the economy, it is possible that the 
new rule changes will depress the entire market and not just the real estate sector. To 
account for this, I will also run an OLS regression of the All Ordinaries index regressed 
upon lags of its returns and the same dummy variables for the regressions mentioned 
above. This regression will test if there is any effect on the market as a whole from the 
aforementioned rule changes.  
IV. Data  
 The daily returns of the four separate indices were all drawn from Capital IQ as 
daily returns weighted by their market capitalization. The two event dates were assigned 
based on the announcement of the event and the date that it had announced that the rules 
were to be enforced.  
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The two indices will be referred to as Index 1 and Index 2. In Index 1, the public 
companies I include are Boral Limited (BLD), Stockland Corporation (SGP), LendLease 
Group (LLC), CSR Limited (CSR), Mirvac Group (MGR), Adelaide Birghton (ABC), 
Sunland Group (SDG), and Villa World (ltd). These equity companies are picked from a 
list of the top residential homebuilders in Australia (Resolute Equipment 2016) and a list 
of the top building and construction material companies in Australia (Barron’s 2017) 
Index 2 is comprised of 14 different companies; the companies mentioned above and 
AVJennings Limited (AVJ), Axiom Properties Limited (AXI), Brickworks Limited 
(BKW), Cedar Woods Properties Limited (CWP), Devine Limited (DVN), Finbar Group 
Limited (FRI), and Velocity Property Group Limited (VP7). These additional companies 
are found using a Capital IQ screen. The criteria for the company are as follows; they 
must be public companies, their primary source of revenue is through real estate 
development or supplying construction materials, must be geographically based in 
Australia, and must be listed on the ASX (Australian Stock Exchange). 
Lend Lease Group (LLC), Sunland Group Limited (SDG), and Villa World Limited 
(VLW) were specifically chosen because they were the three largest public real estate 
development firms based on market capitalization in Australia. I exclude two larger 
companies than SDG and VLW, Peet Limited (PPC) and Aveo Group (AOG). These 
two companies are intentionally excluded because their main focus is the development 
of retirement communities, and since this study’s focuses on residential real estate, they 
were not seen as relevant companies for this analysis. Finally, BLD was added because 
it was one of the largest building and construction material businesses in Australia, and 
therefore would also be affected by a drop in construction activity.  
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Only selecting publicly traded firms limits the scope of the study. A 2016 study of 
the top 10 construction firms by the value of contracts, the study included many 
construction companies that are private and therefore cannot be included in the survey 
(Resolute Equipment 2016). The limit on a number of companies that can be included in 
this study leads to a restrained sample size. Although not possible, the study would be 
greatly enhanced if data on the value of private firms was available.  
The event date for the indices to be regressed upon is May 4th, 2015. The new rule 
changes were announced on May 2nd, 2015 (Vendor Finance 2015). I select May 4th, 
because May 2nd was a Saturday, and the first day Australian market could react to the 
news would be the next closest trading day.  
The regressions for method two are based on May 4th, 2015, for reasons mentioned 
above, and December 1st, 2015. December 1st, 2015 is the date in which the FIRB 
announced the new regulations were to be enforced (Vendor Finance 2015).  
V. Results 
Method (A) Testing for Short Term Effect on Returns  
Tables 1.1 through 3.2 display my findings. The left-hand side of each table 
displays which iteration of the model is run. An event date set at plus or minus one or two 
days with either an event window of 15, 30, or 45 days creates six possible iterations per 
index or stock. On the right-hand side are two columns, one of which is cumulat~n, 
which stands for the cumulative abnormal return relative to the All Ordinaries Index. If 
cumulat~n is positive, that means the index or stock had a positive abnormal return 
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relative to the All Ordinaries Index, and if the value is negative, the index or stock had a 
negative abnormal return. The next column contains the t test. A t-test assesses whether 
the means of two groups are statistically different from each other. The statistical 
significance was determined at the 90%, 95%, and at the 99% level which corresponds to 
absolute statistical values of 1.64, 1.96, and 2.58. 
Table 1.1 presents the findings for the six different iterations for my first basket of 
stocks, which I refer to as index 1. Of the six, only one iteration produces significant 
results at the 90% significance level, the 15-day estimation window set at plus or minus 
two days. However, the significance is lost at the 30 and 45 window. The iteration 
produces a positive result, which goes against my hypothesis. The positive return means 
the market reacted positively to the FIRB rule changes.  
 Table 1.2 also presents the findings for index 2’s returns. The reaction for index 
2’s return to the announcement of the FIRB rule change is assessed. As can be seen in 
table 1.2, none of the iterations produced significant effects.  
 The findings of table 1.1 and 1.2 together suggest little to no correlation between 
the change in the FIRB rules and the stock price performance of real estate development 
and building material companies in Australia. Although there may have been a positive 
effect on raw returns, the connection is weak at best. However, when the analysis was 
decomposed into individual stock returns, results varied. 
 Table 2.1 shows the results for Lend Lease Group.  As can be seen in Table 2.1 
there are positive results at the 99% significant level for both event windows and at every 
estimation window except for plus or minus one day, 30-day window, where it is at the 
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95% significance level. These results suggest a positive and significant effect of the FIRB 
rule changes on the returns of the company. The results of Table 2.1 go against my 
hypothesis, as results are positively significant. These results suggest that the investor 
sentiment believed that the resulting rule changes would help the corporate profits of the 
company.  
 However, when looking at other individual securities in tables 2.2, 2.3, and 2.4, 
results are in line with my hypothesis. There is a negatively significant return at the 99% 
significance window for Sunland Group (SGP) when the estimation windows are set at 
plus or minus one day. Returns are negatively significant at the 99% significance for 
every iteration except for the 45-day estimation window, where it is significant at the 
95% significance level. Results for Villa World Limited (VLW) are statistically 
significant only when set at plus or minus one day. In the 15-day estimation window, it is 
significant at the 99% significance level and was significant at the 95% significance level 
in the 30 and 45 day-estimation levels. However, when set at plus or minus one day, 
results were insignificant. For Boral Limited (BLD), every iteration is negatively 
significant when set at both plus or minus one and two days at the 99% significance level. 
These results produce a clear negative boost on stock performance in relation to the All 
Ordinaries index.  
 When looking at Mirvac Group (MRG), iterations are mixed but insignificant. 
When looking at the plus or minus one-day event window, all iterations are positive and 
insignificant. When the event window is widened to plus or minus two-day event 
window, iterations remained insignificant, however, were now negative. As the most 
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diversified company in my group, the results make sense that returns are insignificant 
from the rest of the group.  
 After running the analysis on different individual public equities, I determine that 
it is possible that the Lend Lease Group is simply an outlier. The Lend Lease Group is the 
largest construction company by market capitalization. It also secures substantially more 
building contracts than any other group in Australia. In 2015 alone, the Lend Lease group 
secured A$4.9 billion in construction contracts, nearly double its next closest competitor, 
who secured A$2.85 billion (Resolute Equipment 2016). Lend Lease Group’s size comes 
with it geographic diversity, and it is projects in America, which may have protected it in 
the eyes of investors from potential decreases in spending from Chinese nationals in 
Australia (Lend Lease Group 2017). Regardless of the possible reasons for Lend Lease 
Group’s positive returns and significance, its size causes it to have a high weight in the 
indices, and therefore could be biasing the results upward. As a result, I remove Lend 
Lease Group from the two indices and re-ran the event window. As can be seen in Table 
3.1 and 3.2, without Lend Lease Group in the study, all results are still positive but results 
remained insignificant at every iteration and additionally, the 15-day estimation window 
set at plus or minus two days lost its significance.  
 For each security, returns could be wildly different from the returns of the All 
Ordinaries index. However, once brought together as a whole, the returns of the real 
estate development and building materials companies became more in line with the 
index. The results could be interpreted in several different ways. One possible 
explanation is investor sentiment did not change due to the announcement of regulations. 
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They believed that the regulations would not affect total construction activity because 
either foreign direct investment from Chinese nationals was not large enough to affect the 
construction activity or the regulations were not robust enough to stem the tide of 
investment. Therefore, the vast changes in the different individual securities are a result 
of happenstance changes in microeconomic factors unrelated to the FIRB. As a result, 
when evaluated as a whole, the returns of the entire sector fall in line with the returns of 
the rest of the Australian equities market.  
 Another reason could be the changes in the FIRB affected individual securities 
differently. The individual securities selected are not a representative sample, as shown 
by the fact that I did not run a regression with each individual security in my index. 
However, the companies that have significant results have different profiles. For instance, 
Villa World Limited has a market capitalization around A$220 million, and Sunland 
Group Limited has a market capitalization around A$200 million, whereas Lend Lease 
Group market capitalization of 6.7 billion (Capital IQ 2017). These differences in market 
capitalizations are due to the amount of construction, geographic diversity, and diversity 
in different projects. This means the companies have varying abilities to react to changes 
in rules to foreign direct investment. Each company’s individual exposure to Chinese 
direct investment affects their stock price, and therefore, only companies with high 
exposure should have their earnings decrease. If only a trivial amount companies have 
high exposure, once indexed, those changes will be dispersed into normal market returns.  
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Method (B) Testing for Long-Term Effect on Returns 
 Tables 4.1 through 5.3 display my results for the OLS regression. Each table 
displays the results for each index and the All Ordinaries index, the t-statistic, and a p-
value. A t-test assesses whether the means of two groups are statistically different from 
each other and p-value evaluates how well the sample data support the argument that the 
null hypothesis is true. It measures how compatible my data is with the null hypothesis. A 
high p-value means I accept the null and a low p-value means I reject the null. My null 
hypothesis is that the FIRB rule changes were immediately priced in and there is no 
effect on the market. As one can see in Tables 4.1 through 5.3, after running the OLS 
regression on the separate indices to see if the FIRB rule changes had any lasting effect 
on the market, I find no significant results for any of the dummies.  
Table 6.1 and 6.2 examine the independent variable of the All Ordinaries Index in 
each of the regressions. Each table displays the beta, t-stat, and p-value of the All 
Ordinaries index. Beta value is a measure of how strongly each predictor variable 
influences the criterion (dependent) variable, one can see the beta for the All Ordinaries 
Index was typically very high, around .88 to 0.9, and it is always significant at either the 
95% or 99% confidence level in all the regression. With a beta, so close to one and with 
99% significance, although the real estate development and building materials equity 
returns were down, the entire Australian equity market was also concurrently falling. 
 When looking at the All Ordinaries section in tables 4.1 through 5.3, the second 
regression with all three dummy variables is not significant either. These results say the 
Australian equity market did not react to either the announcement or the enforcement of 
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the new FIRB rules. These results tell us that there is no lasting effect of the FIRB rule 
changes on either the real estate development sector or the Australian equity market.  
IV. Conclusion 
 This thesis aims to determine the share price reactions for the real estate 
development and building/construction materials sector in Australia based on the rule 
changes on foreign direct investment. By comparing the returns of a composite of 
companies and individual securities to the returns of the overall Australian equities 
market, this study finds that as a group, the Australian real estate development and 
building/construction materials sector was not affected by the FIRB rule changes. 
However, as individual securities, share price reactions are negative and significant for 
many smaller real estate developers and one large building and construction material 
company. These results are in line with my hypothesis that companies in that sector 
would face negative reactions. One outlier company is Lend Lease Group, which 
experienced positive and significant returns in relation to the All Ordinaries market. Lend 
Lease Group’s positive returns go against my hypothesis and further research would be 
required to identify why their returns are positive. Given more resources, an event study 
of all different sectors within real estate, such as REITs would be regressed as well. Also, 
event studies with securities placed into different buckets based on size, geographic 
presence, diversity, and most importantly exposure to Chinese investment could be made 
to see what type of real estate development companies were affected more by the rule 
changes.  
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 The OLS regression of the Australian real estate development companies and 
construction/building materials companies along with a regression of the All Ordinaries 
Index against itself result in no significance. Therefore, there is no lasting effect of the 
FIRB rule changes on the Australian equities markets. This suggests the FIRB rule 
changes were priced into the Australian securities at the date of the announcement. 
 Overall, the results offer some support that the FIRB rule changes harmed 
possibly smaller less diversified real estate development companies, but the overall 
perception for the sector remained unchanged. The FIRB rule changes were not just 
isolated to residential real estate and it is possible, because the beta for the All Ordinaries 
Index is so high, the entire market was affected by the FIRB rule changes and therefore, 
the market depressed as well, making differentiating the returns of the real estate 
development sector and the overall equity market indistinguishable.  
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Figures and Tables 
 
Table 1.1 
Index 1   Coef t 
  cumulat~n test 
Event Window -1/+1 Estimation Window 15 0.0217  1.3040 
Event Window -1/+1 Estimation Window 30 0.0200  1.1845 
Event Window -1/+1 Estimation Window 45 0.0234  1.3875 
Event Window -2/+2 Estimation Window 15 0.0405  1.6599*
Event Window -2/+2 Estimation Window 30 0.0199  1.0363 
Event Window -2/+2 Estimation Window 45 0.0176  0.7789 
 
Table 1.2   
Index 2   Coef t 
  cumulat~n test 
Event Window -1/+1 Estimation Window 15 0.0215  1.2765 
Event Window -1/+1 Estimation Window 30 0.0194  1.1427 
Event Window -1/+1 Estimation Window 45 0.0229  1.3430 
Event Window -2/+2 Estimation Window 15 0.0399  1.6313 
Event Window -2/+2 Estimation Window 30 0.0206  0.9113 
Event Window -2/+2 Estimation Window 45 0.0176  0.7737 
 
Table 2.1 
Lend Lease Group (LLC)   Coef t 
  cumulat~n test 
Event Window -1/+1 Estimation Window 15 0.0283  2.7448***
Event Window -1/+1 Estimation Window 30 0.0238  2.5163***
Event Window -1/+1 Estimation Window 45 0.0294  3.4381***
Event Window -2/+2 Estimation Window 15 0.0784  4.6417***
Event Window -2/+2 Estimation Window 30 0.0612  4.9512***
Event Window -2/+2 Estimation Window 45 0.0601  7.4276***
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Table 2.2 
Sunland Group (SDG)   Coef t 
  cumulat~n test 
Event Window -1/+1 Estimation Window 15 (0.0518) (12.2241)***
Event Window -1/+1 Estimation Window 30 (0.0232) (28.3599)***
Event Window -1/+1 Estimation Window 45 (0.0156) (8.0618)***
Event Window -2/+2 Estimation Window 15 (0.0514) (2.9004)***
Event Window -2/+2 Estimation Window 30 (0.0487) (2.7921)***
Event Window -2/+2 Estimation Window 45 (0.0467) (2.15)**
 
Table 2.3 
Villa World Limited 
(VLW)   Coef t 
  cumulat~n test 
Event Window -1/+1 Estimation Window 15 (0.0535) (2.902)***
Event Window -1/+1 Estimation Window 30 (0.0473) (2.3706)**
Event Window -1/+1 Estimation Window 45 (0.0477) (2.4185)**
Event Window -2/+2 Estimation Window 15 (0.0322) (0.9611)
Event Window -2/+2 Estimation Window 30 (0.0193) (0.5462)
Event Window -2/+2 Estimation Window 45 (0.0201) (0.5732)
 
Table 2.4     
Boral Limited (BLD)   Coef t 
  cumulat~n test 
Event Window -1/+1 Estimation Window 15 (0.0640) (7.6649)***
Event Window -1/+1 Estimation Window 30 (0.0471) (4.3927)***
Event Window -1/+1 Estimation Window 45 (0.0407) (4.9589)***
Event Window -2/+2 Estimation Window 15 (0.0823) (6.2272)***
Event Window -2/+2 Estimation Window 30 (0.0684) (7.3946)***
Event Window -2/+2 Estimation Window 45 (0.0436) (3.1379)***
 
Table 2.5 
Mirvac Group (MGR)   Coef t 
  cumulat~n test 
Event Window -1/+1 Estimation Window 15 0.0056  0.5912 
Event Window -1/+1 Estimation Window 30 0.0058  0.7331 
Event Window -1/+1 Estimation Window 45 0.0013  0.1784 
Event Window -2/+2 Estimation Window 15 (0.0091) (1.2002)
Event Window -2/+2 Estimation Window 30 (0.0049) (0.5505)
Event Window -2/+2 Estimation Window 45 (0.0091) (1.2002)
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Table 3.1     
Index1 - LLC   Coef t 
  cumulat~n test 
Event Window -1/+1 Estimation Window 15 0.0174  1.5199 
Event Window -1/+1 Estimation Window 30 0.0152  0.9774 
Event Window -1/+1 Estimation Window 45 0.0173  1.1311 
Event Window -2/+2 Estimation Window 15 0.0218  1.0219 
Event Window -2/+2 Estimation Window 30 0.0040  0.1759 
Event Window -2/+2 Estimation Window 45 0.0010  0.0425 
 
Table 3.2 
Index2 - LLC   Coef t 
  cumulat~n test 
Event Window -1/+1 Estimation Window 15 0.0174  1.5062 
Event Window -1/+1 Estimation Window 30 0.0147  0.9337 
Event Window -1/+1 Estimation Window 45 0.0169  1.1071 
Event Window -2/+2 Estimation Window 15 0.0214  0.9413 
Event Window -2/+2 Estimation Window 30 0.0039  0.1646 
Event Window -2/+2 Estimation Window 45 0.0015  0.0639 
 
Table 4.1 Table 4.2 
Dummy 1 May 4th, 2015 Dummy 2 May 4th, 2015 
Security/Index T-Stat P-Value Security/Index T-Stat P-Value 
Index 1 (0.66) 0.507 Index 1 1.14  0.254 
Index 2 (0.62) 0.534 Index 2 1.14  0.255 
Index 1 - LLC (0.67) 0.506 Index 1 - LLC 0.84  0.404 
Index 2 -LLC (0.61) 0.540 Index 2 -LLC 0.84  0.401 
All Ordinaries (1.26) 0.210 All Ordinaries 0.35  0.850 
 
Table 4.3 
Dummy 3 May 4th, 2015 
Security/Index T-Stat P-Value 
Index 1 0.99  0.324 
Index 2 0.96  0.338 
Index 1 - LLC 1.17  0.244 
Index 2 -LLC 1.13  0.260 
All Ordinaries 0.22  0.828 
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Table 5.1 Table 5.2 
Dummy 1 
December 1st, 
2015 Dummy 2 
December 1st, 
2015 
Security/Index T-Stat P-Value Security/Index T-Stat P-Value 
Index 1 1.42  0.507 Index 1 0.90  0.371 
Index 2 1.41  0.161 Index 2 0.89  0.373 
Index 1 - LLC 1.28  0.202 Index 1 - LLC 0.69  0.492 
Index 2 -LLC 1.27  0.206 Index 2 -LLC 0.69  0.491 
All Ordinaries 0.68  0.499 All Ordinaries 0.50  0.619 
 
Table 5.3 
Dummy 3 
December 1st, 
2015 
Security/Index T-Stat P-Value 
Index 1 1.40  0.164 
Index 2 1.36  0.174 
Index 1 - LLC 0.21  1.270 
Index 2 -LLC 1.23  0.221 
All Ordinaries 1.59  0.112 
 
Table 6.1 
Significance of All Ordinaries May 4th, 2015 
Index 1 Beta T-Stat P-Value 
Dummy 1 1.000 16.71 0.000 
Dummy 2 1.000 16.71 0.000 
Dummy 3 0.998 16.59 0.000 
    
Index 2 Beta T-Stat P-Value 
Dummy 1 0.978 16.48 0.000 
Dummy 2 0.977 16.48 0.000 
Dummy 3 0.975 16.37 0.000 
    
Index 1 - LLC Beta T-Stat P-Value 
Dummy 1 0.931 14.73 0.000 
Dummy 2 0.930 14.70 0.000 
Dummy 3 0.928 14.63 0.000 
    
Index 2 -LLC Beta T-Stat P-Value 
Dummy 1 0.901 14.51 0.000 
Dummy 2 0.901 14.49 0.000 
Dummy 3 0.899 14.41 0.000 
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Table 6.2       
Significance of All Ordinaries December 1st, 2015 
Index 1 Beta T-Stat P-Value 
Dummy 1 0.979 16.58 0.000 
Dummy 2 0.986 16.74 0.000 
Dummy 3 0.986 16.77 0.000 
    
    
Index 2 Beta T-Stat P-Value 
Dummy 1 0.962 16.47 0.000 
Dummy 2 0.970 16.64 0.000 
Dummy 3 0.968 16.67 0.000 
    
Index 1 - LLC Beta T-Stat P-Value 
Dummy 1 0.902 15.07 0.000 
Dummy 2 0.908 15.23 0.000 
Dummy 3 0.907 15.25 0.000 
    
Index 2 -LLC Beta T-Stat P-Value 
Dummy 1 0.882 15.00 0.000 
Dummy 2 0.888 15.15 0.000 
Dummy 3 0.887 15.17 0.000 
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Figure 3 
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Figure 5 
 
 
 
Source:Capital IQ 
 
Figure 6 
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Figure 7 
 
Source:Capital IQ 
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Figure 9 
 
 
Source:Capital IQ 
 
Figure 10 
 
Source:Capital IQ 
 
May‐04‐2015, 
6.29
0.00
1.00
2.00
3.00
4.00
5.00
6.00
7.00
8.00
Jan‐02‐2014 Jan‐02‐2015 Jan‐02‐2016
Boral Limited
May‐04‐2015, 
5815.89
Dec‐01‐2015, 
5312.62
4000.00
4500.00
5000.00
5500.00
6000.00
6500.00
Jan‐02‐2014 Jan‐02‐2015 Jan‐02‐2016
All Ordinaries Index
37 
 
Appendix 
Index of 7 Results 
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